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A BIRTHDAY TOAST TO
TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
Manning G. Warren III*
ABSTRACT
This article commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of the Second Cir-
cuit’s Texas Gulf Sulphur decision by examining the impact of the case on
insider trading law in the United States. The author begins by discussing
the SEC’s opinion, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., which laid the
foundation for the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision by creating a federal duty
to disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from trading securi-
ties. The author then posits that the SEC, in its Cady, Roberts decision,
rejected judicially developed common law fiduciary duty to disclose based
on trust and confidence, and, by administrative fiat, substituted a broader
federal duty of disclosure centered on access and unfairness. Next, the arti-
cle examines how the Cady, Roberts decision would fair under the Su-
preme Court’s modern insider trading law. Finally, the article concludes
with a discussion of the court’s adoption of a new federal duty of disclosure
in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
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I. INTRODUCTION
NORMALLY we make birthday toasts to honor and applaud anindividual on the attainment of a given age, celebrating the mo-mentous occasion with “here, heres” and a clanging of glasses
held high. My toast here, by contrast, is to an insider trading opinion by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, SEC v. Texas Gulf
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Sulphur Co.,1 decided fifty years ago this year, and it is hardly laudatory.
While not a metaphorical Frankenstein,2 the Second Circuit’s decision is
a strange admixture of disparate parts, from false assumptions to
fabricated theories, much like the spider eyes, roach legs, and slug juices
that might be stirred together in a witch’s brew.
In this brief commentary, I will not reiterate all the criticisms or the
praise lavished on the decision by countless academics.3 Instead, I will
proffer a number of observations on the strangeness of its judicial brew.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the hands on the ladle were those of a law
professor. As law professors, we are always stirring our own cauldrons,
but Professor William Cary seems to have been especially gifted. In craft-
ing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) opinion, In the
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.,4 he provided the essential ingredients for
the nonsensical morass of our present insider trading laws. Since Cary, in
his Cady, Roberts opinion, provided the foundation for the Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur, I will address how Cady, Roberts
creatively overrode the common law of fiduciary duty by fashioning a
broader federal duty of disclosure based not on trust and confidence, but
on access and unfairness. I will follow that discussion with a few critical
comments on the birthday girl.
II. IN THE MATTER OF CADY, ROBERTS & CO.
When Professor Cary became Chairman of the SEC in 1961, the com-
mon law of fraud applicable to insider trading in anonymous stock ex-
change transactions was encapsulated by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts’s decision in Goodwin v. Agassiz.5 In Goodwin, the court
expressed the majority view that, at least in non-face-to-face exchange
transactions, corporate officers and directors have no fiduciary duties to
disclose non-public material information they possess by virtue of their
position as insiders.6 Their fiduciary duties run solely to the corporation
1. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
2. See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Bantam Books 1991).
3. See, e.g., Alan M. Weinberger, Forever Young: Texas Gulf Sulphur Rules at Fifty,
45 SEC. REG. L. J., no. 1, Spring 2017; Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corpo-
rate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA.
L. REV. 1271 (1965); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Equal Access to Information: The Fraud at
the Heart of Texas Gulf Sulphur (UCLA SCH. OF LAW, Law & Economics Research Paper
Series No. 17-14), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014977; Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas
Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of Two Duties (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Georgetown Law Library), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=3036&context=facpub.
4. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
5. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1222 (1995) (“Goodwin apparently remains the prevailing
state law view.”).
6. Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 661 (“Purchases and sales of stock dealt in on the stock
exchange are commonly impersonal affairs. An honest director would be in a difficult situ-
ation if he could neither buy nor sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corpora-
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and its shareholders collectively, and not to individual shareholders. In
anonymous exchange transactions, officers, directors, and other corpo-
rate agents acting in their individual capacities are engaging their trading
contraparties at a very distant arm’s length. Since these officers and direc-
tors have no fiduciary duty to disclose the inside information (and are
fiducially bound by confidentiality), their failure to do so cannot work a
constructive fraud. More succinctly put, their conduct does not constitute
common law fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, no common law
case had ever held, certainly at the time Cady, Roberts was decided, that
anyone had a duty to disclose insider information in faceless transactions
effected over stock exchanges.7
Chairman Cary was determined to right this perceived wrong in inter-
preting the terms “fraud or deceit,” as set forth in the SEC’s Rule 10b-5,8
by establishing what one scholar has labeled “a higher ideal of fiduciary
responsibility.”9 Apparently, Cary was on a mission as the SEC’s new
chair to rewrite his own common law at the federal level.10 The Cady,
Roberts proceeding provided him the opportunity to rule for the first time
that open market trading on inside information constituted fraud. His de-
cision had little, if anything, to do with the actual common law of fraud or
the common law of corporate fiduciary duty. In other words, he deter-
mined his own meaning of the terms “fraud or deceit” in complete dis-
tion without first seeking out the other actual ultimate party to the transaction and
disclosing to him everything which a court or jury might later find that he then knew affect-
ing the real or speculative value of such shares. . . . Law in its sanctions is not coextensive
with morality. It cannot undertake to put all parties to every contract on an equality as to
knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness. It cannot undertake to relieve against hard
bargains made between competent parties without fraud. On the other hand, directors can-
not rightly be allowed to indulge with impunity in practices which do violence to prevailing
standards of upright business men. Therefore, where a director personally seeks a stock-
holder for the purpose of buying his shares without making disclosure of material facts
within his peculiar knowledge and not within reach of the stockholder, the transaction will
be closely scrutinized and relief may be granted in appropriate instances.”).
7. See Richard W. Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of
Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 NW. U. L. REV. 809, 811–12
(1968).
8. Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”).
9. Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of In-
sider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1999). According to Professor
Langevoort, “Cary’s speeches and writings during and after his chairmanship at the SEC
leave little doubt that he believed that state corporate law was moribund, perhaps even
corrupt.” Id. Cary’s goal required “a substantial blurring of the line between fraud and
fiduciary duty, and something of a disdain for the spirit of federalism.” Id. Indeed,
Langevoort correctly concluded, “fraud plays relatively little formal role” in the Cady,
Roberts decision. Id.
10. Id. at 1319 (citing JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
344–45 (2d ed. 1995)).
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dain of any common law referents.11
Given the facts underlying the Cady, Roberts decision and, more im-
portantly, Cary’s mission to reject state common law precedent, he could
hardly look to Goodwin for the desired result. The underlying factual cat-
alyst in Cady, Roberts was a decision taken at a meeting of Curtiss-Wright
Corporation’s board of directors to reduce significantly the company’s
quarterly dividend.12 After this decision was made, the board immedi-
ately authorized public disclosure of this concededly material informa-
tion13 by a Western Union telegram to the New York Stock Exchange.14
Due to typing problems, the telegram transmitted to Western Union at
11:12 a.m. was not actually delivered to the New York Stock Exchange
until 12:29 p.m. That was not the only snafu in communications. Due to
what the opinion referred to as “some mistake or inadvertence,” the com-
pany did not get the news to the Wall Street Journal until 11:45 a.m., and
it did not appear on the Dow Jones ticker tape until 11:48 a.m. One of the
company’s directors, J. Cheever Cowdin, was a registered representative
of Cady, Roberts, and a registered broker-dealer. Apparently assuming
the dividend reduction had already been publicly disseminated, Cowdin
provided the information to his colleague Robert Gintel at Cady, Rob-
erts, who subsequently entered open market sell orders on the New York
Stock Exchange. The SEC subsequently charged Cady, Roberts and
Gintel with willful violations of Rule 10b-5.15 The case was resolved pur-
suant to an offer of settlement, which included a waiver of any hearing,
stipulated facts, and a suspension of Gintel from the New York Stock
Exchange for twenty days.
Chairman Cary, after acknowledging the case was one of first impres-
sion,16 opined that Rule 10b-5 was a “broad remedial provision[ ] aimed
11. It is a well-established principle that when Congress adopts a common law term
like “fraud” or “deceit,” it incorporates the general common law principles embodied by
the term. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[w]here Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or common law, a court must infer,
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms.” NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981); see also
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318 (1992). In Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), the Court held that in adopting the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Congress incorporated the fully consistent common law
of fiduciary duties, because the Court “discerned nothing in the limited regulatory objec-
tives of the [Investment Company Act] or [the Investment Advisers Act] that evidenced a
congressional intent that ‘federal courts . . . fashion an entire body of federal corporate law
out of whole cloth.’” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (quoting
Burks, 441 U.S. at 480). In Cady, Roberts the SEC simply abandoned the Supreme Court’s
established rules of statutory construction. For a general discussion of judicial treatment of
state law in federal securities regulation, see Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Fed-
eral Questions: The Common Law of Federal Securities Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L. 155
(1995).
12. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961).
13. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976) (“[a]n omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important in deciding how to vote.”).
14. In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 909.
15. Id. at 908.
16. Id. at 907.
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at [ ] misleading or deceptive activities,” regardless of whether those ac-
tivities are “precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law
action for fraud and deceit.”17 In his view, the federal securities laws had
created “a wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation
law.”18 He then proceeded to write that law up from scratch, fabricating a
federal duty to disclose or abstain from trading applicable to any person
who possesses material, non-public inside information.19 Cary claimed
this duty rested on two core principles: (1) “the existence of a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be availa-
ble only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of any-
one,” and (2) “the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing.”20
In a presumed reference to the conflicting common law of both fraud
and fiduciary duty, Cary pronounced, “we are not to be circumscribed by
fine distinctions and rigid classifications.”21 His creativity was certainly
not circumscribed by the common law of corporate fiduciary duty. Cary
then proclaimed that Gintel, as the recipient of Cowden’s tip, had the
same duties to disclose or abstain from trading in open markets as insid-
ers (which before this opinion there were none, either under common law
or federal law).22 According to Cary, Gintel’s conduct “at least” violated
the third clause of Rule 10b-5, which prohibits “[any] . . . practice which
operated as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers.”23
Under Cary’s new federal duty to disclose or abstain, Gintel, by neither
disclosing nor abstaining, committed securities fraud. Surprise, surprise!
In this case, acknowledged by Cary as one of “first impression,” how
could Gintel have known he was acting illegally? And how were his anon-
ymous counterparties to the trades defrauded? As Professor Donald
Langevoort has articulated, Cary “never confronted or even mentioned
in all of this [ ] the central holding of the despised Goodwin, that what is
lacking in open market insider trading (as opposed, arguably, to face-to-
face dealings) is anything resembling detrimental reliance by the so-called
victims of the fraud on any aspect of the insider’s conduct.”24 Indeed,
before Cary’s post hoc decision, the tipper, the tippee, the tipper’s sellers,
and the tippee’s buyers could not have possibly guessed that Cary would
be creating a new federal non-fiduciary duty to disclose by obliterating
17. Id. at 910.
18. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, one prominent scholar has credited Cary with coin-
ing the term federal corporation law. James D. Cox, Fraud is in the Eyes of the Beholder:
Rule 10b-5’s Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 674, 676
(1972).
19. See In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
20. Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 913; see Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2017).
24. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1321.
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the established common law and rewriting § 10(b)25 and Rule 10b-5 of
the federal securities laws. Given Cary’s astounding creativity, it is under-
standable why Professor Louis Loss would later state, “if Professor Cary
[did] nothing else at the SEC he has earned his pay in Cady, Roberts &
Co.”26
One can easily surmise that Gintel’s settlement offer, agreeing to a sur-
prisingly lenient twenty day suspension,27 might have been suggested by
Cary himself. Thus preempting any appeals, he was positioned to adjudi-
cate a radically new insider trading rule without concerns about any due
process ramifications. He could also avoid any federal judicial review, at
least for long enough to establish his opinion as a final adjudication by
the SEC, and, as we shall see, a persuasive, foundational precedent for
the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Moreover, by developing his
rule through an enforcement proceeding, he was able to circumvent the
notice and comment procedures required in agency rulemaking by the
Administrative Procedure Act.28 Most importantly, Cary was able to es-
tablish a purposely vague definition of a new and broad-based insider
trading prohibition imposing liability based on access and unfairness and
largely detached from the disclosure philosophy Congress had embraced
in enacting the federal securities laws.29
III. CADY, ROBERTS AND MODERN INSIDER
TRADING JURISPRUDENCE
Academic curiosity readily compels the question of whether the ex-
pertly-concocted opinion in Cady, Roberts would be sustainable today
under modern federal securities law jurisprudence. It was written fifteen
years before the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,30 held
that § 10(b) required proof of scienter, or intent to deceive, and, accord-
ingly, that the SEC could not proscribe any practice that would operate as
a fraud or deceit, but could only prohibit wrongdoing that was inten-
tional.31 Additionally, in Hochfelder, the Court admonished the SEC that
“[t]he rulemaking power granted to [ ] administrative agenc[ies]” did not
include “the power to make law,” but rather “to adopt regulations to
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
26. See W. McNeil Kennedy & Herbert S. Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unu-
sual Case, 20 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1057 n. 2 (1965) (citing Cary, Israels & Loss, Recent Develop-
ments in Securities Regulation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 856, 861 (1963)).
27. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 918 (1961) (Comm’r Frear, dissent-
ing in part).
28. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372,
7521 (2012).
29. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (quoting 113 Cong.
Rec. 854 (1967)) (discussing the legislative intent of the Williams Act) (“This legislation
will close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal securities laws by re-
quiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons seek to ob-
tain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer or through open market or privately
negotiated purchases of securities.”).
30. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
31. See id. at 193.
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carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.”32
Just one year later, the Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,33 held that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not and should not address
breaches of corporate fiduciary duty.34 The Court emphasized that the
fundamental purpose of the federal securities laws was to implement a
“philosophy of full disclosure” and that the “fairness” of a transaction is
“at most a tangential concern of the statute.”35 Moreover, the Court ex-
pressly cautioned against “applying a ‘federal fiduciary principle’ under
Rule 10b-5 [that] could be expected to depart from state fiduciary stan-
dards.”36 Not only did the Court refuse to equate fraud with breaches of
fiduciary duty, but it also questioned the validity of any new federal cor-
poration law.37
Subsequently, in Chiarella v. United States,38 the Court rejected the
SEC’s parity of information theory, which applied the disclose or abstain
rule to any person with access to non-public material inside informa-
tion.39 Instead, the Court, in ironic contrast to Santa Fe Industries,40 ruled
that there was no general duty to disclose before trading on material, non-
public information,41 but rather a person possessing such information
only has a duty to disclose or abstain from open market trading where
that person has a fiduciary relationship with his or her trading
counterparties.42 Finally, in Dirks v. SEC,43 the Court rejected the SEC’s
argument that “anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material infor-
mation from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.”44
The Court stated that a tippee derives a fiduciary duty from the tipping
insider only where the insider has breached her fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration’s shareholders (presumably, collectively) by disclosing the infor-
mation to the tippee and where the tippee knows or should know that the
insider has breached her fiduciary duty by using the inside information
for personal advantage, i.e., the insider must personally benefit, directly
or indirectly, from her disclosure.45
32. Id. at 213 (citations omitted).
33. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
34. Id. at 472.
35. Id. at 478.
36. Id. at 479.
37. Id. at 478–79.
38. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
39. Id. at 235.
40. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 462.
41. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
42. See id. at 235. Certainly, corporate officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to
their respective corporations, but the common law, as discussed, does not impose fiduciary
duties that run to anonymous counterparties to the insiders’ trades. The Court here, simi-
larly to the SEC in Cady, Roberts, simply fabricated a federal duty under Rule 10b-5. In
doing so, it left insider trading jurisdiction in “theoretical ruins.” See Manning G. Warren
III, A Foreword on Insider Trading Regulation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 337, 342 (1988).
43. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
44. Id. at 656–57.
45. Id. at 660. In 2016, the Supreme Court upheld Dirks in Salman v. United States,
137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016).
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The Cady, Roberts decision predated, and therefore avoided, almost all
of the Supreme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence. For instance, the
SEC did not undertake the scienter analysis required by Hochfelder
before its novel expansion of Rule 10b-5. Additionally, the SEC, in direct
contradiction of the Court’s holding in Santa Fe Industries, openly ex-
pressed its belief in a new federal corporation law and rejected state com-
mon law in order to address its own perceived unfairness of any trading
by those with inside information. Furthermore, the SEC’s prohibition of
insider trading by anyone with access to inside information was rejected
outright in Chiarella and Dirks as outside the ambit of Rule 10b-5.
And lastly, the SEC in Cady, Roberts never even considered whether
the tipper, who the SEC did not charge with a Rule 10b-5 violation,
breached any fiduciary duties by disclosing information that he assumed
had already been publicly disseminated, an analysis required by the Court
in Dirks.46 Moreover, the SEC made no determination that the tippee it
did charge with a Rule 10b-5 violation knew or should have known that
his insider tipping both breached fiduciary duties and derived personal
benefit from the disclosure. Indeed, the tipper’s innocent disclosure
should not be viewed as a breach of fiduciary duty where the tipper’s
purpose in making the disclosure was not to defraud anyone, but to share
what he thought was common knowledge. Even the Court in Dirks raised
these doubts in recognizing that “[c]orporate officials may mistakenly
think the information already has been disclosed.”47 How could the tip-
pee derive a breach of fiduciary duty from an innocent tipper and be
charged with derivative liability for fraud? As in Dirks, the tippee had no
pre-existing duty to the company’s shareholders, took no action that in-
duced the tipper to repose trust in him, had no expectation from the tip-
per to keep the information in confidence, and did not misappropriate
the information.48 Clearly, the SEC, which in Cady, Roberts took the po-
sition that the existence of a fiduciary duty should not be relevant, would
face difficult challenges under modern securities law jurisprudence if it
were compelled to re-litigate the Cady, Roberts charges in a federal court.
IV. SEC V. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CO.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the SEC sought judicial approval for
its opinion in Cady, Roberts that access to inside information and inher-
ent unfairness justified its disclose or abstain insider trading prohibition
46. One former SEC Commissioner has written that Cowdin, as the tipper in Cady,
Roberts, “quite plausibly had good reason to assume that the news of the dividend cut was
public at the time he made his phone call to Gintel.” Jack M. Whitney II, Section 10b-5:
From Cady Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 BUS. L. 193, 199 (1965). He
posited that the SEC’s focus in Cady, Roberts was on the conduct of a registered broker
dealer in “jumping the gun” for the benefit of his clients and not on insider trading gener-
ally. Id. at 198–99. I disagree.
47. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
48. See id. at 665.
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under Rule 10b-5.49 In an article analyzing the SEC’s then recently filed
complaint in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the authors stated:
It is plain that in the Texas Gulf case, the Commission is seeking
judicial approval for the rule it announced in Cady, Roberts & Co.,
namely, that corporate officers, directors, and controlling sharehold-
ers, and any one else who has access to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, may not take advantage of
such material information by trading in the issuer’s securities, while
such information is unavailable to the persons with whom they are
dealing.50
The SEC was successful in this endeavor. The Second Circuit, long
before the Supreme Court’s imposition of deference to administrative
agency interpretation in Chevron,51 fully subscribed to the SEC’s position
in Cady, Roberts. The court gave its judicial imprimatur to the broadest
implications of Cady, Roberts, which have been described by one influen-
tial scholar as “astonishing.”52 The court fully embraced the parity of in-
formation rule:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own ac-
count in the securities of a corporation has “access, directly or indi-
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone” may not take
“advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing,” i.e., the investing public. Matter of Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). Insiders, as directors or man-
agement officers are, of course, by this Rule, precluded from so un-
fairly dealing, but the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the
information who may not be strictly termed an “insider” within the
meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act. Cady, Roberts, supra. Thus, any-
one in possession of material inside information must either disclose
it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such information remains undisclosed.53
The SEC brought its case against various Texas Gulf Sulphur geologists
and other insiders for violation of Rule 10b-5 because they purchased
49. See Kennedy & Wander, supra note 26, at 1061. According to one scholar, “[a]s
chair, Cary wanted the imprimatur of a federal court decision giving explicit judicial ap-
proval of the disclose-or-abstain duty.” Weinberger, supra note 3.
50. Kennedy & Wander, supra note 26, at 1061.
51. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52. William H. Painter, Insider Information: Growing Pains for the Development of
Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1375 (1965). In this
article, Professor Painter notes that Congress, in its consideration of § 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, which then provided the only substantive restriction on insider
trading (and limited solely to officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders), “rejected a
suggestion that the use of inside information be made unlawful, in view of the problems of
proof involved.” Id.
53. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
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Texas Gulf Sulphur securities on the basis of the company’s undisclosed
discovery of major mineral deposits in Timmins, Ontario.54 Three of
these defendants, like Cowdin, the uncharged tipper in Cady, Roberts,
honestly believed the news of the strike had been publicly disclosed.
Proof of intent to defraud, the court held, was unnecessary because negli-
gent insider conduct was enough.55 Obviously unable to foresee the op-
posite conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder56 and
Aaron v. SEC,57 the court erroneously concluded that there was no clear
indication of congressional intent to require a showing of scienter under
Rule 10b-5.58 According to the court, the standard of conduct prohibited
by Rule 10b-5 “encompasses negligence as well as active fraud,” and in-
cludes “lack of diligence, constructive fraud [and] unreasonable or negli-
gent conduct.”59 The court determined that § 10(b) was a catch-all,60 but
it failed to note, in the words of Justice Powell in Chiarella, that “what it
catches must be fraud.”61 For the Court in Chiarella and subsequently in
Dirks, failure to disclose material, non-public information before trading
securities does not violate Rule 10b-5 unless the trader has a fiduciary
duty to disclose. In both Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur, the exis-
tence of a fiduciary duty was irrelevant.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC’s efforts in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur to impose a
federal non-fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain on anyone in possession
of material, non-public information, based on access and unfairness, was
initially successful. In the end, the Supreme Court, primarily in Chiarella
and Dirks, rejected the SEC’s parity of information theories by requiring
not just access and unfairness, but also some sort of fiduciary relationship
between the insider and her anonymous counterparties in the impersonal
exchange markets. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in United States v.
54. For an excellent discussion of the factual context and continued development of
Texas Gulf Sulphur’s Ontario mine, see Weinberger, supra note 3.
55. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854–55.
56. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
57. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
58. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 855.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 859.
61. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980). Strangely, Justice Powell in
Chiarella made the erroneous observation that the SEC had never adopted a parity of
information rule and cited both Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur with apparent ap-
proval. Id. at 233. Perhaps, to be charitable, Justice Powell meant that the SEC had never
promulgated an administrative rule that expressed its Cady, Roberts parity of information
rule. Subsequently, in Dirks, Justice Powell specifically rejected the parity of information
rule, which the Court had acknowledged was a theory the SEC had advanced in Chiarella
and again in Dirks. In Dirks, the Court specifically rejected the SEC’s “theory of tippee
liability,” that “anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656–57
(1983). The Court’s insertion of the term “fiduciary” is, of course, bewildering, given that
while the SEC asserted a “duty,” that duty was not dependent on a fiduciary relationship in
either Cady, Roberts or Texas Gulf Sulphur. Instead, the SEC and the Second Circuit fo-
cused on “access” and “unfairness.”
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O’Hagan62 adopted the SEC’s misappropriation theory, a position the
SEC argued too late in Chiarella.63 The Court still insisted on a fiduciary
link, but the relationship could also be between the inside trader and the
source of the information, typically her employer or other principal.64
Has the misappropriation theory adopted by the Supreme Court brought
us full-circle back to the SEC’s parity of information theory, as embraced
by Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur? The answer is no, but the SEC
was able to recover a large swath of lost ground. The Barry Switzers65
and Mark Cubans66 of the world remain beyond the SEC’s reach, and,
perhaps, some inside traders of debt securities.67 But given its enforce-
ment fervor for insider trading prosecutions68 and its unwillingness to de-
62. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). For further discussion of O’Hagan,
see Christopher J. Bebel, A Detailed Analysis of United States v. O’Hagan: Onward
Through the Evolution of the Federal Securities Laws, 59 LA. L. REV. 1 (1998); Randall W.
Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief)
Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
865 (2003).
63. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (“[The United State’s brief]
argues that petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon
information that he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of a printer em-
ployed by the corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a conviction under
§ 10(b) for fraud perpetrated upon both the acquiring corporation and the sellers. We need
not decide whether this theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury.”); see also
Manning G. Warren III, Who’s Suing Who? A Commentary on Investment Bankers and the
Misappropriation Theory, 46 MD. L. REV. 1222 (1987).
64. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. In reality, the Court’s decision has delegated anti-fraud
authority to employers and other principals who are now positioned to either consent to
their agents’ trading securities based on material non-public information or to bring an
insider trading action against those employees. Since the Court has not bought Cady, Rob-
ert’s access and fairness argument, corporate principles have the power to erase the fiduci-
ary links necessary for a successful insider trading action. As a result, both the SEC and
inside traders’ contraparties in exchange transactions find themselves as remediless under
Rule 10b-5 as they were under Goodwin and state common law.
65. See generally SEC. v. Switzer, 590 F.Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
66. See generally SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
67. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1213.
68. The SEC’s enforcement of Rule 10b-5’s insider trading prohibition continues as
fast and furious as ever. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan & Liz Moyer, William T. Walters, Famed
Sports Bettor, Is Guilty in Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/dealbook/william-t-walters-famed-sports-
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sider Trading, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1596 (Oct. 9, 2017); Cara Bayles, Ross Stores Insider
Trading Charges Have To Go, Judge Told, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.law360
.com/articles/996070; Antoinette Gartrell, SanDisk Exec Tipped Relatives to Merger Talks,
SEC Says, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1597 (Oct. 9, 2017); R.J. Vogt, SEC Scores Insider
Trading Settlement With Ex-PWC Auditor, LAW360 (Sep. 13, 2017), https://www.law360
.com/articles/963564; Andrew Ramonas, N.J. Doctor To Settle SEC Insider Trading
Charges For $34k, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1592 (Oct. 9, 2017); Nicole Hong, Ruling Buoys
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velop a more determinative insider trading definition,69 whether by
statute or regulation, the SEC may yet see a return to its golden era of
Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur. The future lies in the virtues of
vagueness.70
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